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Abstract
An autonomous system is constructed by a manufacturer, op-
erates in a society subject to norms and laws, and is inter-
acting with end-users. We address the challenge of how the
moral values and views of all stakeholders can be integrated
and reflected in the moral behaviour of the autonomous sys-
tem. We propose an artificial moral agent architecture that
uses techniques from normative systems and formal argu-
mentation to reach moral agreements among stakeholders.
We show how our architecture can be used not only for eth-
ical practical reasoning and collaborative decision-making,
but also for the explanation of such moral behavior.
Introduction
Artificial autonomous systems depend on human interven-
tion to distinguish moral from immoral behaviour. Explicitly
ethical agents (Moor, 2006) or agents with functional moral-
ity (Wallach and Allen, 2008, Chapter 2) are able to make
moral judgements, but who decides which moral values and
principles such artificial agents should be taught?
There are several candidates to teach agents aspects of
morality. A governmental regulator can determine which be-
haviour is legal with respect to the society in which the
agent is operating. Manufacturers and designers are con-
cerned with issues of liability, and with the image and values
they stand for. The persons directly interacting with the au-
tonomous system should be able to choose some aspects of
its moral behaviour. Instead of choosing one of these candi-
dates, we want to combine concerns of all these stakeholders
into a coherent system of values, norms and principles that
an artificial agent can use.
If we are building an implicit ethical agent, in the sense of
Moor (2006), then we can manually, albeit perhaps painstak-
ingly, put together the different concerns from the stakehold-
ers and construct a single ethical theory. However, some-
times an explicit ethical agent needs to be built that uses its
autonomy to make moral decisions (Dyrkolbotn, Pedersen,
and Slavkovik, 2018). In that case, the off-line composition
of moralities is impossible, and it raises the research ques-
tion of this paper: How should an autonomous system dy-
namically combine the moral values and ethical theories of
various stakeholders?
Copyright c© 2018, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
Let us imagine that each of the “morality” stakehold-
ers are represented with an “avatar” agent within an au-
tonomous intelligent system governed by an artificial moral
agent. These “avatars” are the “moral council” of the sys-
tem, like Jiminy Cricket is to Pinokkio. An artificial moral
agent makes a decision by choosing from a set of available
actions and first needs to identify whether an ethical option
among these actions exists. If there is at least one action for
which the stakeholders anonymously agree that is ethical,
then this is the action the system should take. If however,
all of the available actions are unethical, or there is no una-
nimity on the valuation of the actions, then the “morality
council” needs to come up with a direction of what action
to choose. To do this, the recommendations of the “morality
council” need to be combined.
The challenge of building the “moral council” is that the
stakeholders may not be following the same ethical reason-
ing theory. It is not enough that each of the stakeholders
agents chime in with “yes” or “no” when the morality of an
action is presented. We do not want to evaluate the morality
of an action by a majority-poll, or always put the law above
the image of the manufacturer, or the personal input of the
end-user above the guidelines of regulatory bodies. Instead,
we wish to have an engine that is able to take inputs from
the different stakeholders and bring them into an agreement.
Furthermore, this should be done in such a way so that the
artificial moral agent is able to explain its choice of action
(Anderson and Leigh Anderson, 2014) or that choice should
be formally verifiable (Dennis, Fisher, and Winfield, 2015).
We propose that normative systems (Chopra et al., 2018)
and formal argumentation (Baroni et al., 2018) can be used
for the task of implementing a “moral council” for an artifi-
cial moral agent. Using this approach we can abstract away
from how a particular decision concerning the morality of an
action is reached by a particular stakeholder. We model each
stakeholder as a source of arguments. An argument can be
a statement of whether an action is moral, or a reason why
a particular action should be considered (i)moral. Abstract
argumentation allows us to build a system of arguments at-
tacking and supporting each other that can be analysed to
determine which statements supported and which are refuted
in the system at a given time. This system can also generate
explanations of decisions using dialogue techniques.
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Artificial Moral Agent (AMA) Architecture
In this section we introduce an architecture for an artifi-
cial moral agent (or briefly, AMA), motivated by the fol-
lowing smart home example from https://imdb.uib.
no/dilemmaz/articles/all (Pires Bjørgen et al.,
2018). In the running example, the AMA is a family home
with internal cameras. It has an air conditioning system and
it regularly checks air quality and makes sure there are no
risks of carbon monoxide poisoning or similar in the home.
One day the AMA detects clear signs of the smokable drug,
marijuana, in one of the teenagers’ room. The system checks
against the local legal system and determines that posses-
sion of marijuana is illegal in this jurisdiction. The smart
home has then three choices: Should the house do nothing,
alert only the adults and let them handle the situation or
alert the local police as well. The stakeholders in this case
are the family owning the house, the manufacturer of the
autonomous system and the legal system of the jurisdiction
under which the house falls.
In an AMA, different stakeholders supply different norms
associated with some ethical concerns and values reflect-
ing them. Norms from different stakeholders with different
values may suggest different and conflicting decisions in a
specific situation. To reconcile these differences, a mecha-
nism is needed that can find an agreement and also, when
prompted, offer an explanation to how a specific morally
sensitive decisions has been made.
The architecture of an AMA we propose for the running
example can be visualised in Figure 1. We assume that the
AMA has three stakeholders: the family living in the smart
home, the region in which the house is located represented
with the laws governing it and the manufacturer of the smart
home.
Figure 1: Artificial Moral Agent (AMA)
In an AMA, the first important component is a set of
normative systems corresponding to the different stakehold-
ers. A normative system describes how actions in a system
of agents can be evaluated and how the behavior of these
agents can be guided (Alchourron, 1991). A norm is a for-
mal description of a desirable behavior, desirable action or
a desirable action outcome. Furthermore, normative systems
can also be seen as rule-based systems in which norms can
be given with reasons supporting their enforcement. Besides
presenting norms, stakeholders can also present standpoints
or claims to affect the decision making of an AMA.
The AMA makes a decision by first determining the state
of the world in terms of a set of perceptions. A decision de-
pends on the state of the world observed and the set of norms
gathered from the three normative systems. Norms are as-
sociated with values to reflect ethical concerns of different
stakeholders. Since norms may be in conflict, an agreement
needs to be reached by means of comparing and evaluating
arguments constructed from these norms. Finally, the system
gives an explanation concerning why an action is activated.
The three normative systems, called NS1, NS2 and NS3,
respectively represent the family, the manufacturer of the
smart home and the legal system associated with the ju-
risdiction to which the smart home pertains. Let us assume
that the norms and claims in these normative systems are the
norms n1 ∼ n8 and the standpoint a1, where each of norms
is associated with its own set of “values” given in curly
brackets. Here, “values” can be understood as moral “goals”
associated to a hierarchical moral value system which all
moral agents possess. We assume that a value system for the
AMA is given and discuss this assumption later in the paper.
NS1 Three norms and a standpoint in the normative system
of the family:
n1 :{Healthy} If a child smokes marijuana, then his be-
havior counts as a bad behavior. (Parents)
n2 :{Responsibility} If a child has bad behavior then his
parents should be alerted. (Parents)
n3 :{Autonomy} When a child has bad behavior, if his
parents have been alerted then no police should be
alerted. (Parents)
a1 : If smoking marijuana is for a medical purpose, then
from smoking marijuana one can not infer that it is an
illegal behavior (i.e., n7 is not applicable). (Child)
NS2 Three norms in the normative system of the manufac-
turer:
n4 :{Good To Consumers} We should do good to our
consumers.
n5 :{Legality} We should obey the law.
n6 :{Protect Privacy} If we want to do good to our con-
sumers, we should not report their actions to the police
unless it is legally required to do so.
NS3 Two (related) norms in the normative system of the
law:
n7 :{Healthy, Legality} If a minor smokes marijuana,
his behavior counts as an illegal behavior.
n8 :{Legality} If there is an illegal behavior, then a po-
lice should be alerted.
Besides sets of norms and standpoints from different
stakeholders, there are some observations dynamically ob-
tained by sensors, e.g., “a child is smoking marijuana”, “the
child’s smoking is for recreational purpose”, etc. In addition,
in the knowledge base, there are some beliefs, e.g., “if an
observation shows that smoking marijuana is for recreation,
then normally it is for recreational purpose”.
Argumentation-based reasoning engine
In this section we focus on how to balance conflicting claims
from different stakeholders and to explain the decisions
that have been made. We introduce a formal argumentation-
based approach.
Abstract argumentation framework
An abstract argumentation framework (AAF) is a graphF =
(A,R), whereA is a set of arguments andR ⊆ A×A a set
of attacks. Intuitively an argument is a conclusion supported
by a set of premises with some specific logical structure. By
using the sets of norms, the set of observations and the set
of beliefs in the knowledge base, we may construct an AAF
as visualized in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Smart-home argumentation example. The text in
each blue rectangle is the claim of a norm, while the text in
each gray rectangle is either an observation or a proposition
of a belief. Each solid arrow denotes a support relation, of
which the label indicates that it’s a norm or a belief. Each
dotted arrow is an attack, which can be rebutting, undercut-
ting, or undermining. The capital letters A,B,C,D,E indi-
cate arguments.
Formal argumentation is a nonmonotonic formalism for
reasoning in the context of disagreement. For example, the
normative system of the parents implies the norm that “the
smart-home should call the parents and should not call the
police”, but on the other hand the legal normative system
implies the norm “the smart-home should call the police.” In
this sense, formal argumentation is different from classical
logic, and more similar to para-consistent logic. This kind of
conflict is called rebut in formal argumentation, because two
conclusions of arguments are in conflict with each other.
There are also other kinds of conflicts between arguments.
For example, in argument D, assume that “for medical pur-
pose” is not a fact but an assumption. Then, it can be at-
tacked by an observation showing that it is not the case. This
kind of attacks are called undermining in formal argumen-
tation. Moreover, argument D neither conflicts with the ob-
servation “a child is smoking marijuana” nor with the claim
“the child’s smoking is illegal” of the argument B. Instead,
it breaks the relation between these two statements, saying
that the norm n7 is not applicable. This is called undercut-
ting in formal argumentation.
Structured argumentation containing arguments and the
relations among them can be represented by natural lan-
guage or formal languages. In the literature there are sev-
eral formalisms for structured argumentation, e.g., ASPIC+,
DeLP, ABA, and classical argumentation. In this paper, we
focus on addressing the issues of agreement reaching and
explainability and to do this it is sufficient to remain at the
level of abstract argumentation.
In our running example, we may construct the following
five arguments, in which some sub-arguments are not explic-
itly represented.
- A (from NS1, parents) Should not alert the police, since
a child smoking marijuana counts as a bad behavior (to
promote “Healthy”), and if a child has bad behavior then
his parents should be alerted (to implement “Responsibil-
ity”), and if the parents are alerted then the police should
not be alerted (to promote “Autonomy”).
- B (from NS3) The police should be alerted, since a child
smoking marijuana counts as an illegal behavior (to pro-
mote “Healthy” and “Legality”), and if there is an illegal
behavior then the police should be alerted (to implement
“Legality”).
- C (from NS2) Should not alert the police, since
we should do good to consumers (to promote
“Good To Consumers”), and if we want to do good
to our consumers then we should not alert the police
unless it is explicitly illegal to not do so (to implement
‘Protect Privacy”).
- D (from NS1, child) For a medical purpose, from smok-
ing marijuana one should not infer that one exhibits illegal
behavior.
- E (from background knowledge) The child’s smoking
is for recreational purpose, since an observation shows
that it is not for a medical purpose.
In our system we distinguish two types of arguments:
practical arguments and epistemic arguments. The practi-
cal arguments are reasoning about norms and are associated
with sets of values, while the epistemic arguments are rea-
soning about the state of the world without associating val-
ues. An AAF corresponding to the smart home argumenta-
tion in Figure 2 can be visualized in Figure 3.
When an AAF is enriched with values, it is usually
called a value-based argumentation (VBA), e.g., in Bench-
Capon, Atkinson, and Chorley (2005). In the setting of
this paper, a new version of VBA is defined as FV =
(Ap,Ae,R, Ag, V, val, pi), whereAp is a set of practical ar-
guments constructed from norms and associated with values,
Ae is a set of epistemic arguments constructed from obser-
vations and standpoints, R ⊆ (Ap × Ap) ∪ (Ae × Ae) ∪
(Ap×Ae) is a set of attacks between arguments, Ag is a set
of agents representing different stakeholders, V is a set of
values, val : Ap → 2V is a function mapping each practical
argument to a set of values, and pi : Ae ∪ Ap → 2Ag is a
function mapping each argument to a set of agents. When
the associated values and agents are not considered, a VBA
is reduced to an AAF F = (Ap ∪ Ae,R).
Figure 3: Abstract argumentation framework corresponding
to the smart home argumentation in Figure 2, in which each
practical argument is associated with a set of agents who
contribute to the argument and a set of values involved,
while each epistemic argument is associated with a set of
agents who contribute to the argument.
Agreements by argumentation
Abstract argumentation provides a general mechanism for
agreement reaching. In terms of argumentation, a decision
can be understood as accepting or rejecting a set of argu-
ments by considering the interaction among arguments and
the values associated to them.
Given a VBA FV = (Ap,Ae,R, Ag, V, val, pi), when no
values are consider, the acceptance of arguments can be eval-
uated in an AAF F = (Ap ∪ Ae,R). In terms of formal
argumentation (Dung, 1995), a set of arguments that can be
accepted together is called an extension. There are differ-
ent types of extensions, which can be defined on the basis
of two important notions: conflict-freeness and defence. Let
A = Ap ∪Ae. Given a set E ⊆ A, we say that E is conflict-
free iff there exist no A,B ∈ E such that A attacks B. E
defends an argument A ∈ A iff for every argument B ∈ A
if B attacks A then there exists C ∈ E such that C attacks
B. Then, we say that E is admissible iff it is conflict-free
and defends each argument in E ; E is a complete extension
iff E is admissible and each argument in A defended by E is
in E ; E is a preferred extension iff E is a maximal complete
extension with respect to set-inclusion; E is a grounded ex-
tension iff E is a minimal complete extension with respect to
set-inclusion.
When the AAF F has more than one extension, we need
to decide which one should be selected. Since values are
degrees of importance of some things or actions, one may
argue that a reasonable solution is to accept the one that
reaches the maximal extent of agreement over a set of values.
We define this new notion as follows.
For an extension E ⊆ A associated with a set of value
VE = ∪A∈E∩Apval(A), we say that it reaches the maxi-
mal extent of agreement over V iff there is no another ex-
tension E ′ ⊆ A associated with a set of values VE′ =
∪A∈E′∩Apval(A) and VE′ has a higher priority over VE , de-
noted as VE′  VE . We call this approach value-based opti-
mization. Here, the priority relation between two sets of val-
ues can be defined in term of a partial ordering over V and a
lifting principle, e.g., the elitist principle or the democratic
principle. Given a partial ordering over V by using v1 ≥ v2
to denote v1 is at least as good as v2, and two sets V1 ⊆ V
and V2 ⊆ V , the democratic principle can be defined as:
V1 Dem V2 iff for all v ∈ V2 there exists v′ ∈ V1 such that
v′ ≥ v. The elitist principle can be defined as: V1 Eli V2
iff there exists v ∈ V2 for all v′ ∈ V1: v ≥ v′.
Based on the above notions, the agreement reaching can
be realized in two steps. First, compute the set of extensions
in a reduced AAF F = (Ap ∪ Ae,R). Second, choose a
subset of extensions that maximize the extent of agreement
over V .
For the purposes of the argumentation-based reasoning
engine, we want an agreement among the stakeholders that
maximizes the extent of agreement, namely that maximizes
each set of accepted arguments. From this aspect, the pre-
ferred extension perfectly meet this requirement, while some
other types of extensions might not. This is because in
some complete extensions, some credulously acceptable ar-
guments are not included. Here, by saying an argument is
credulously acceptable, we mean that it is in at least one ex-
tension, but not in all extensions of an AAF.
Since each AAF has a nonempty set of preferred exten-
sions, and both the relations Dem and Eli are partial or-
ders, it holds that for each AAF, there exists at least one
preferred extension that maximizes the extent of agreement
over a set of values.
Consider the running example again. Let vl ≥ vr ≥ vp ≥
va ≥ vg ≥ vh be a partial ordering over the set of val-
ues in the VBA in Figure 3. We assume that this ordering
is provided according to a given value system. Then, the re-
duced AAF has two preferred extensions E1 = {B,E} and
E2 = {A,C,E}. We have that E1 maximizes the extent of
agreement over the set of values by using both the demo-
cratic and elitist principles, while E2 maximizes the extent
of agreement over the set of values by using the elitist prin-
ciple.
From this example, we may observe that to maximize the
extent of agreement, we need to consider the ordering over
values and the principle for lifting ordering. Formal argu-
mentation provides a good way for composing these differ-
ent factors to reach an agreement. There could be another
types of agreement. For instance, we may also consider the
number, and the degrees of importance, of different stake-
holders. We leave this for future exploitation.
Explainability of agreements
When an AMA makes a decision, it is desirable that it can
explain why an action is selected or not. Recently, method-
ologies, properties and approaches for explanations in arti-
ficial intelligence have been widely studied (Biran and Cot-
ton, 2017). As presented in Miller (2017), explanations are
contrastive since people do not ask why event P happened,
but rather why event P happened instead of some event
Q, and social in the sense that explanations are a transfer
of knowledge, presented as part of a conversation or in-
teraction. It is interesting to note that both contrastive and
social aspects of explanations can be implemented by ex-
ploiting argumentation. For the former, different options can
be compared and evaluated in an AAF, while for the latter
argument-based dialogues can be used to formalize the pro-
cess of explanations (Walton, 2011; Cˇyras, Satoh, and Toni,
2016; Cocarascu, Cˇyras, and Toni, 2018).
To explain why and how a decision is made, one needs
to first identify an argument whose conclusion is the deci-
sion. Next, in a dialogical graph corresponding to the AAF
where the argument is located, state that the argument can
be accepted because all of its attackers are rejected, which is
in turn because at least one of the attacker of each attacker
is accepted, and so on. In the context of this paper, whether
a decision is taken depends not only on the interaction be-
tween arguments, but also on the maximization of the extent
of agreement over a set of values or a set of stakeholders. To
further improve the explanation we need to provide the other
candidate sets, the non-maximal ones and contrats them with
the set supporting the made decision.
Consider the running example again. Assume that for
agreement reaching, one chooses to maximize the extent of
agreement over the set of values by using the democratic
principle. In this case, we say that action “The police should
be alerted” is selected, because:
Derivability “The police should be alerted” is a conclusion
of an argument B, which can be derived from an observa-
tion “a child smokes marijuana” and two norms “if a child
smokes marijuana, their behavior counts as an illegal be-
havior” and “if there is an illegal behavior then the police
should be alerted”.
Agreement reaching The extension E1 = {B,E} which
contains the argument B is selected since E1 maximizes
the extent of agreement over the set of values by using
democratic principle.
Justification in a dialogue graph Argument B is accepted
with respect to E1, because all its attackers are rejected:
- argument A is rejected because its attacker B is accepted.
- argument C is rejected because its attacker B is accepted.
- argumentD is rejected because its attacker E is accepted.
The above dialogue can be represented as a dialogue game
or a discussion game. Readers may refer to Vreeswijk and
Prakken (2000); Booth, Caminada, and Marshall (2018) for
details.
Assumptions and evaluation
In this section we outline the assumptions that should be sat-
isfied for the Artificial Moral Agent (AMA) Architecture to
be feasible. This can be used both for the evaluation, as well
for guiding further research relaxing the assumptions.
Before anything we should clarify where the values and
their order of priority for an AMA come from. There are
numerous moral values that can be specified and moral phi-
losophy shows there is no such thing as an absolute exhaus-
tive set of values, norms and/or moral principles. Although
the AMA may operate in varying different contexts, the set
of its actions, level of autonomy and criticality of the sys-
tem are known by design. E.g., a smart home cannot detect
smoke if it is not equipped with smoke sensors. The Interna-
tional Society of Automotive Engineers (2016) distinguishes
between five categories of vehicles based on their level of
required supervision of a driver. While an airplane autopilot
operates a critical system, a smart home does not have ac-
cess to features that can kill hundreds of people when they
malfunction. How critical a system is in particular impacts
the order of values the connected AMA should heed - for ex-
ample, in a non-critical system a user can be free to set the
value order. With the development of autonomous systems
it is reasonable to expect that a characterization of relevant
values and priorities over them will be made available by the
relevant certification authorities when the system housing an
AMA is approved for market.
In addition to this assumption of value (order) origin,
we analyze the assumptions made on the stakeholders, the
argumentation-based engine and the overall knowledge-
based representation.
Knowledge-based representation. An autonomous sys-
tem such as a smart home is equipped with sensors based on
which the AMA associated with this system is able to estab-
lish the state of the world and build a knowledge-base used
in its reasoning. We assume that the AMA has an ontology
of propositions, actions and moral values and it is able to
transform sensor data into parts of the ontology. This is a
known problem of information engineering, see e.g. Ziafati
(2015) for an overview of the state of the art.
Stakeholder assumptions. It is clear that stakeholders
cannot have a human representative available for each auto-
mated system that exists in the market so an artificial agent
to acts as an avatar for the stakeholder needs to be con-
structed. This artificial avatar agent needs to be able to pose
arguments during decision-making.
It is reasonable to expect that each stakeholder can, at de-
ployment, identify a set of values that they would uphold,
and that these values will not change through the life time
of the AMA. In contrast, the arguments used in a decision-
making are context-dependent and cannot all be specified
at deployment but must be dynamically constructed. Auto-
mated argument extraction is a very new field concerned
with how arguments can be identified in natural language
(Walton, 2012; Sergeant, 2013). While identifying argu-
ments is not the same as constructing them during argumen-
tation, this method can be used to enable an avatar to repre-
sent a stakeholder in a “discussion”. Laws are already spec-
ified in natural language, whereas manufacturers and users
will have to be tasked to explicitly write a document that ex-
presses the normative systems they would like to represent
them. It is an open problem to characterize the form of this
document.
Argumentation-based engine assumptions The AMA
itself, based on its underlying argumentation framework def-
inition, needs to be able to identify the state of the world,
evaluate arguments, identify argument relations, align argu-
ments with values, and compare values. An approach to this
is to construct the agent’s ontology in such a way that it is
able to express whether two arguments or values are in con-
flict or not.
Related work
It is not clear whether an artificial agent can ever be a moral
agent categorically as people are (Moor, 2006; Etzioni and
Etzioni, 2017). It is however, clear that some level of moral
behaviour can be implemented in machines. Wallach and
Allen (2008) distinguish between operational morality, func-
tional morality, and full moral agency. Moor (2006) dis-
tinguishes between ethical impact agents, explicit, implicit
and full moral agency, see also Dyrkolbotn, Pedersen, and
Slavkovik (2018). Some proposals and prototypes on how to
implement moral agency are already being put forwards like
Anderson and Leigh Anderson (2014); Arkin, Ulam, and
Wagner (2012); Bringsjord, Arkoudas, and Bello (2008);
Vanderelst and Winfield (2017); Dennis et al. (2016); Lind-
ner and Bentzen (2017).
It has been shown that people consider that the same ideas
of morality do not pertain both to people and to machines
(Malle et al., 2015). It is argued in Charisi et al. (2017), that
the complex issue of where machine morality comes from
should be considered from the aspect of all stakeholders -
all persons who in some way are impacted by the behaviour
of and decisions made by an autonomous system. They dis-
tinguish between government and societal regulatory bodies
on one end, manufacturers and designers on the other, and
end-users, customers and owners on the third. Noted that
these broad categories of stakeholders can further be subdi-
vided, for example one can distinguish between owners and
“leasers” of the autonomous system1.
While it has been argued in the literature that an au-
tonomous system should be built to integrate moral, societal
and legal values , see for example Dignum (2017); Charisi
et al. (2017), to the best of our knowledge no approach has
been proposed as how to accomplish this. This is the first
work that explicitly considers the problem of integrating the
moral values of multiple stakeholders in the artificial moral
agent.
The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),
specifically, the GDPR (Sections 13-15) gives users affected
by automated decision-making a right to obtain “meaningful
information about the logic involved, as well as the signif-
icance and the envisaged consequences of such processing
for the data subject”. One way to obtain this is by building
systems capable to give arguments supporting the decisions
they make. Our approach provides for this.
Explainability has not been considered a critical feature in
logic based systems, e.g., Dennis et al. (2016); Lindner and
Bentzen (2017); Bringsjord, Arkoudas, and Bello (2008),
since here one can use formal methods to prove what be-
haviour of an autonomous systems is possible in which con-
texts. We argue however that a formal proof, while “acces-
sible” to a regulatory body is not sufficient to constitute ex-
plainability to common people. The GenEth system of An-
derson and Leigh Anderson (2014) uses input from profes-
sional ethicists and machine learning to create a principle
of ethical action preference. GenEth can “explain” its deci-
sions by stating how two options were compared and what
1https://robohub.org/should-a-carebot-bring-an-alcoholic-a-
drink-poll-says-it-depends-on-who-owns-the-robot/
were the ethical features of each.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed an argumentation-based ar-
chitecture for moral agents as social agents, in the sense that
the moral agents take also the practical reasoning of other
agents into account. In particular, the moral agent combines
normative systems of several stakeholders towards reaching
an ethical decision. In other words, we enrich the decision
making of the ethical autonomous agent by collaborative
decision-making of the stakeholders. Whereas other existing
architectures of social agents only take the goals or utilities
of other agents into account, our moral agent is social in the
stronger sense of including concepts and techniques from
collective reasoning like norms, argumentation and agree-
ment. Likewise other collective reasoning techniques can be
adopted from game theory or the theory of negotiation. The
agent architecture gives also explanations for moral deci-
sions in terms of justification and dialogue.
A key distinguishing feature of our architecture is that the
stakeholders can adopt distinct ethical theories. The ethical
reasoning is therefore not hardwired into the system, but rep-
resented by the normative theories the stakeholders adopt. In
addition, as usual the stakeholders can adopt distinct ethical
values. So, even if two stakeholders agree on the ethical the-
ories they adopt, they can still have conflicting arguments
due to differences in the values they adopt.
We also discuss the assumptions and limitations of the
AMA architecture. In future work we will make the architec-
ture more widely applicable by relaxing the assumptions of
the model, in particular by introducing learning techniques
and introducing recursive modeling of stakeholders by other
stakeholders. We will develop a user-guide and methodol-
ogy to define the ontology, normative theories and knowl-
edge base. We will integrate other components such as ma-
chine learning, neural networks, Bayesian reasoning, causal
reasoning, or goal oriented (or BDI) reasoning into the ar-
chitecture. In addition we will model more examples and
develop realistic case studies to drive the development of
our architecture. Finally, we will develop standards for the
ontology and study how to integrate the architecture with
the IEEE 1471-2000 standard.
Two challenges for future research stand out. The first
challenge is how to decide on the preference ordering on
the ethical values in the system that are here assumed as
given. As conflicts among the arguments of the stakehold-
ers may be based on conflicts among their ethical values,
another layer of argumentation may be needed to decide the
preferences among them. The second challenge is how to
ensure that all stakeholders are treated fairly. For example,
if first the manufacturer and the legal system have to intro-
duce their normative systems, and only thereafter the user
can introduce its normative system knowing the other nor-
mative systems, then the user may have an unfair advantage.
To study this kind of fairness, techniques from social choice
theory may be useful.
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